Imagine a world without emotion, a world without anger, love, happiness, or fear. In Equilibrium, Christian Bale’s Preston lives in such a world, a nation in which emotions are illegal and the punishment for them is death. He is a “grammaton cleric,” an enforcer of the anti-emotion law. He has been trained not only to feel nothing, but to destroy all things that feel or inspire feeling. This is how the fascist government of Libria maintains its supposedly ‘peaceful’ and ‘harmonious’ state: by committing heartless acts of violence upon its citizens and abruptly halting any and all cultural or intellectual progression or accumulation of knowledge. Prior to this scene, Preston destroyed the original “Mona Lisa” because it inspires emotion. But in the following scene, he does just the opposite. He, too, has begun to feel. He is now inspired to act in accordance with his own ‘conscience’, his previously suppressed internal governing force, and this internal force has proven to be quite a match for the external, oppressive forces of the Librian government.
In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault presents two models for governing the masses: the plague model versus Bentham’s Panopitcon. The plague model details the extent to which the governing magistrates went in order to prevent the spread of the plague. All citizens were locked in their homes from the outside and all houses, streets, and city borders and gates were supervised by armed guards. Foucault writes that “the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects” which resulted in the sick being “caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning” (553), but although this model was perfect, it was also “absolutely violent” (556). He explains, “to the disease that brought death, power opposed its perpetual threat of death” (Foucault 556). The concept of the Panopticon is an extension of the segmentation, differentiation, and individualization of the plague model, but with one significant difference. The plague model involves an externalized power of violence and threats of violence whereas the Panopticon results in power-over through the internalization of the governing forces without violence. Foucault explains that those who possess knowledge will also possess power, and that this power is most effectively exercised when it becomes a part of the individual himself; when he exercises it over himself.
The Librian government in Equilibrium attempts to create this Panoptic form of government. All citizens appear to be governing themselves: they inject the anti-emotion serum daily and supervise themselves and each other. But the existence of the ‘Clerics’ is enough in itself to prove that the power lies not in the internalization of knowledge-power, but rather in the ever-present threat of death. This is the primary fault of Libria. It indirectly professes to be a Panoptic nation, one which, “although it arranges power, […] it does so not for power itself, nor for the immediate salvation of a threatened society: its aim is to strengthen the social forces—to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, [and to] raise the level of public morality” (Foucault 556). But Libria does not actually do these things. Instead, it suppresses knowledge within individuals and within the disciplines. Only a select few have knowledge, and thus, as soon as an individual gains knowledge for himself, he will not govern himself according to those in power, but rather according to himself and his newfound insight. A society based on the “old principle of ‘levying violence’” is not conducive to the Panoptic “principle of ‘mildness-production-profit’” (Foucault 563): the people will rebel against external government, against the threat of violence, more so than they would be inclined to rebel against an internalized governing force.
This thin veil of ‘self-surveillance’ inherent in the Librian government is quickly torn asunder when Preston sees the defenseless and cuddly puppy. He has been trained to destroy such emotion-inspiring stimuli, but because he, like most humans, is more influenced by internal forces than external ones, he chooses to protect it. Furthermore, the fact that he has no stake in preserving the status quo other than the threat of physical harm (which he cares little about) means he is not afraid to act in opposition to it. This is a prime example of the need, in modern society at least, for more than just external governmental forces and threats of violence. The use of the disciplines, rather than violence, to “assur[e] the ordering of human multiplicities” (562) is proven in this scene to be the preferred means of government. Had Preston been taught to internalize the disciplines, to believe he is an empowered individual with a stake in the success of his culture, he would have been less inclined to disrupt that culture. However, there is no way to reconcile a fascist state (and Libria is literally one, what with its head of state being called “Father”) with one which encourages individual self-surveillance and self-government. Preston is proof of this.
But even if this film emphasized the success of a Panoptic state, Preston would still be a rebel. For he uses the disciplines, the knowledge he accumulates, to act in subversion of his culture. He acknowledges the current state of things, the ways of thinking, the expectations, and prescribed behaviors, and he enacts them as long as it suits him. He infiltrates his own society, and tears it down from the inside. When Foucault writes that “panopticism constituted the technique, universally widespread, of coercion” and that “the ‘Enlightenment,’ which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines” (565), he demonstrates that knowledge has always been and will always be used to govern individuals, either through force or coercion. Thus, individuals like Preston who acknowledge knowledge, but then use their knowledge of knowledge to subvert those in power or the internal coercive power, are the only ones who are capable of creating change. But because this is an action movie first, and a political commentary second, he resorts to extreme ‘matrix-esque’ violence and saves the day that way.
Works Cited
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 549-566.
Sunday, March 29, 2009
Friday, March 13, 2009
Eddie Izzard: The Comedy of Ideological Subversion
Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.
—Karl Marx, from The German Ideology
I was raised Catholic. I went to Catholic school, I observed Lent, and was even an altar girl once the politically correct/ equal opportunity movements found their way into the Church. I believed; but according to Luis Althusser, I believed because I acted. I acted not because I was afraid for my afterlife or being controlled by the 'earliest form of government' as I have so often professed, but rather because I recognized the material manifestation of this ideology as a part of my subjective self. Eddie Izzard takes this dominant ideology, as well as those of the Church of England and the Protestants, and shows them to be just that—ideologies. They are physical and material behaviors which create a sense of meaning, but which are not the result of a ‘higher power’ or divine inspiration. Izzard subverts the often taken for granted ideology behind Catholicism by highlighting the arbitrariness of its origins, and he does the same with the birth of the Church of England. By doing so, he aligns himself with the writings of Marx, Althusser, and Gramsci in that he, too, challenges the accepted meaning, significance, and manifestations of dominant ideologies.
Althusser writes that the recognition that occurs between a subject and an ideology is similar to when someone knocks on your door and says "it's me" in response to "who's there?" (698). It becomes obvious who the knocker is. The same applies to one's recognition of the material manifestation of an ideology. For centuries, various religious leaders maintained their dominance based on the assertion that their religion came directly from ‘God’. Izzard asserts, conversely, that religion comes from people, and even worse, that these people create religions for self-serving purposes. In "The German Ideology", Marx writes that “we ascend from earth to heaven” and that “we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive […] in order to arrive at men in the flesh” (656). Instead, we begin as real men (and women) and create our dominant ideologies; we produce ourselves into existence through our actions. However, this production of ideologies through action is typically limited to those who are in power: “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (Marx 656). Once those in power enact their preferred ideas, these ideas become ideals, and then ideologies, and then universalities.
This is exactly what Izzard mocks in his discussion of the birth of the Church of England. Rather than being divinely inspired, it was merely the result of a selfish and power-hungry king who wanted what he wanted when he wanted it. Izzard also mocks the Catholic Church by commenting that it follows the “teachings of Cathol.” The fact that a comedian can get away with such a commentary is indicative of the progressive decline in power of these previously dominant ideologies, and this in turn is indicative of a shift in what Antonio Gramsci calls “social hegemony” (673). Hegemony, according to Gramsci, entails the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (673), and the Catholic bishops and Pope and King Henry VIII both utilized this means of disseminating ideas and ensuring compliance. Because these leaders are no longer in power, the ideologies have lost their significance. But these leaders would not have been able to dominate their subjects had they not utilized their primary advantage: their ability to control the “material force of society” (Marx 656). Henry VIII, for example, had control over the means of production as well as the labor power of his subjects so he was able to change the dominant ideas of the epoch. By changing the dominant ideology from that of Catholicism to that of the Church of England (both of which are quite similar), he inadvertently highlighted the weakness of both of these ideologies. If something that everyone ‘believed’ in is so malleable that a king can just up and change it, it must not be very strong. And if it is possible to create a new religion in one day, it, too, must not be independent or divinely inspired.
Thus, Izzard’s commentary on the significance of and meaning behind dominant ideologies supports the ideas set forth by some of the strongest and most influential Marxist/ Economic theorists. However, what Izzard neglects to mention is the relationship between the subjects and the leaders in terms of propagating and perpetuating ideologies. Althusser states that the recognition and enactment of ideologies by subjects are ultimately synonymous with “the reproduction of the relations of production and of the relations deriving from them” (701). In other words, the creation of religion to suit a King’s desire for independence from the Pope and for the ability to divorce his wife resulted in the birth of new ideology, and this ideology only became dominant because the King’s power over his subjects in a material sense is reflected in and motivated by the ideology. The ideology itself is nothing without the subjects’ enactment of it (through praying the right way, paying Church taxes, etc.), and the subjects are motivated to act out this ideology as a result of their preexisting production relations. They are already inferior in terms of their class, so it is acceptable for the majority of them to be inferior to the King in terms of ideology.
Although Marx, Gramsci, and Althusser argue differently and to different ends at times, I cannot help but notice the circularity and interconnectedness of their ideas. Nor could I avoid relating these notions to Izzard’s commentary on religion and to my own views on religion. I accept that religion itself is not a negative or destructive thing; however, when it or any ideology is constructed by men as divinely inspired or bigger than mankind, and then is used by said men to manipulate the masses, it is important to note that these ideologies are not about the people's thoughts, but about their actions. And if ideologies are only successful based on the physical practice of prescribed behaviors, then there is the possibility of freedom from them by altering one’s actions. This is why I am no longer Catholic—because I am no longer practicing. It is that simple. Unfortunately for all the victims of religious oppression or persecution due to ideological differences, these ideas were not available previously. Instead, they were convinced that if they did not act in accordance with the dominant ideology (and unknowingly create the dominant ideology through their actions), they would be punished by God, the Law, the King, etc., and they would be considered “inconsistent, […] or cynical, or perverse” (Althusser 696).
Works Cited
Althusser, Luis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 693-702.
Gramsci, Antonio. “Hegemony.” Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 673.
Marx, Karl. “The German Ideology.” Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 653-58.
—Karl Marx, from The German Ideology
I was raised Catholic. I went to Catholic school, I observed Lent, and was even an altar girl once the politically correct/ equal opportunity movements found their way into the Church. I believed; but according to Luis Althusser, I believed because I acted. I acted not because I was afraid for my afterlife or being controlled by the 'earliest form of government' as I have so often professed, but rather because I recognized the material manifestation of this ideology as a part of my subjective self. Eddie Izzard takes this dominant ideology, as well as those of the Church of England and the Protestants, and shows them to be just that—ideologies. They are physical and material behaviors which create a sense of meaning, but which are not the result of a ‘higher power’ or divine inspiration. Izzard subverts the often taken for granted ideology behind Catholicism by highlighting the arbitrariness of its origins, and he does the same with the birth of the Church of England. By doing so, he aligns himself with the writings of Marx, Althusser, and Gramsci in that he, too, challenges the accepted meaning, significance, and manifestations of dominant ideologies.
Althusser writes that the recognition that occurs between a subject and an ideology is similar to when someone knocks on your door and says "it's me" in response to "who's there?" (698). It becomes obvious who the knocker is. The same applies to one's recognition of the material manifestation of an ideology. For centuries, various religious leaders maintained their dominance based on the assertion that their religion came directly from ‘God’. Izzard asserts, conversely, that religion comes from people, and even worse, that these people create religions for self-serving purposes. In "The German Ideology", Marx writes that “we ascend from earth to heaven” and that “we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive […] in order to arrive at men in the flesh” (656). Instead, we begin as real men (and women) and create our dominant ideologies; we produce ourselves into existence through our actions. However, this production of ideologies through action is typically limited to those who are in power: “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (Marx 656). Once those in power enact their preferred ideas, these ideas become ideals, and then ideologies, and then universalities.
This is exactly what Izzard mocks in his discussion of the birth of the Church of England. Rather than being divinely inspired, it was merely the result of a selfish and power-hungry king who wanted what he wanted when he wanted it. Izzard also mocks the Catholic Church by commenting that it follows the “teachings of Cathol.” The fact that a comedian can get away with such a commentary is indicative of the progressive decline in power of these previously dominant ideologies, and this in turn is indicative of a shift in what Antonio Gramsci calls “social hegemony” (673). Hegemony, according to Gramsci, entails the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (673), and the Catholic bishops and Pope and King Henry VIII both utilized this means of disseminating ideas and ensuring compliance. Because these leaders are no longer in power, the ideologies have lost their significance. But these leaders would not have been able to dominate their subjects had they not utilized their primary advantage: their ability to control the “material force of society” (Marx 656). Henry VIII, for example, had control over the means of production as well as the labor power of his subjects so he was able to change the dominant ideas of the epoch. By changing the dominant ideology from that of Catholicism to that of the Church of England (both of which are quite similar), he inadvertently highlighted the weakness of both of these ideologies. If something that everyone ‘believed’ in is so malleable that a king can just up and change it, it must not be very strong. And if it is possible to create a new religion in one day, it, too, must not be independent or divinely inspired.
Thus, Izzard’s commentary on the significance of and meaning behind dominant ideologies supports the ideas set forth by some of the strongest and most influential Marxist/ Economic theorists. However, what Izzard neglects to mention is the relationship between the subjects and the leaders in terms of propagating and perpetuating ideologies. Althusser states that the recognition and enactment of ideologies by subjects are ultimately synonymous with “the reproduction of the relations of production and of the relations deriving from them” (701). In other words, the creation of religion to suit a King’s desire for independence from the Pope and for the ability to divorce his wife resulted in the birth of new ideology, and this ideology only became dominant because the King’s power over his subjects in a material sense is reflected in and motivated by the ideology. The ideology itself is nothing without the subjects’ enactment of it (through praying the right way, paying Church taxes, etc.), and the subjects are motivated to act out this ideology as a result of their preexisting production relations. They are already inferior in terms of their class, so it is acceptable for the majority of them to be inferior to the King in terms of ideology.
Although Marx, Gramsci, and Althusser argue differently and to different ends at times, I cannot help but notice the circularity and interconnectedness of their ideas. Nor could I avoid relating these notions to Izzard’s commentary on religion and to my own views on religion. I accept that religion itself is not a negative or destructive thing; however, when it or any ideology is constructed by men as divinely inspired or bigger than mankind, and then is used by said men to manipulate the masses, it is important to note that these ideologies are not about the people's thoughts, but about their actions. And if ideologies are only successful based on the physical practice of prescribed behaviors, then there is the possibility of freedom from them by altering one’s actions. This is why I am no longer Catholic—because I am no longer practicing. It is that simple. Unfortunately for all the victims of religious oppression or persecution due to ideological differences, these ideas were not available previously. Instead, they were convinced that if they did not act in accordance with the dominant ideology (and unknowingly create the dominant ideology through their actions), they would be punished by God, the Law, the King, etc., and they would be considered “inconsistent, […] or cynical, or perverse” (Althusser 696).
Works Cited
Althusser, Luis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 693-702.
Gramsci, Antonio. “Hegemony.” Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 673.
Marx, Karl. “The German Ideology.” Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 653-58.
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